


CONTENTS

About the Series	xiii
Preface by Dennis Showalter	xv
Chronology	xxi



Alienation of Soldiers: Did soldiers who had fought at the front feel permanently alienated from civilian culture?	1
Yes. The conditions of the fighting and the remoteness of many theaters combined to establish a barrier of understanding between those who fought and those who did not. (<i>Paul Du Quenoy</i>)	2
No. The myth that front-line soldiers were alienated from homefront society is based on the experience of a small, vocal group. (<i>H. B. McCartney</i>)	6
American Military Independence: Was U.S. insistence on maintaining military independence a decisive element in the Allied victory?	10
Yes. Military independence allowed the American forces to defend Paris successfully in the summer of 1918 and to spearhead the decisive counteroffensive in September of the same year. (<i>Paul Du Quenoy</i>)	11
No. American troops performed poorly under their own officers, and the Allied victory can be attributed simply to the American role in introducing two million fresh troops at a time when the Central Powers had no more manpower reserves. (<i>James Corum</i>)	14
No. General Pershing's intransigence concerning the integration of U.S. troops into existing Allied units cost lives and time when both were in short supply. (<i>James J. Cooke</i>)	18
American Tactics: Was General Pershing's emphasis on open warfare appropriate for the Western Front?	21
Yes. General Pershing recognized that the war could not be decided from the trenches. The problem of the American Expeditionary Force (AEF) was less a failure of strategy than defective training systems. (<i>James J. Cooke</i>)	22
No. The American Expeditionary Force (AEF) went to Europe with a tactical doctrine unsuitable to the nature of the war and, as a result, U.S. forces paid a heavy price. (<i>Mark E. Grotelueschen</i>)	25
Anglo-German Naval Race: Was the naval arms race the central factor in the growth of Anglo-German antagonism prior to World War I?	29
Yes. As the premier naval power at the turn of the twentieth century, Great Britain felt threatened by the growing naval capabilities and heavy-handed diplomacy of Germany. (<i>Paul Du Quenoy</i>)	30

No. The German naval threat was almost welcome, as the one challenge Britain was confident it could defeat. German hostility was instead the price Britain paid for rapprochement with her imperial rivals, France and Russia. (<i>John Abbatiello</i>)	33
Arab Uprising: Did the Arab uprising of 1916 contribute significantly to the military and political developments in the Middle East?	37
Yes. The Arab revolt gave the Allies political leverage in the region and established Arab nationalism as a postwar force. (<i>John Wheatley</i>)	38
No. The Arab revolt represented a minor military event that was peripheral to the more significant fighting taking place west of the Jordan River. (<i>Edward J. Erickson</i>)	39
Austria–Hungary: Did Austria-Hungary’s abandonment of great-power status to concentrate on the Balkans play a major role in generating the Great War?	43
Yes. Austria-Hungary in 1914 had become, de facto, another Balkan power, and it was correspondingly indifferent to the consequences of its actions in Europe. (<i>Graydon A. Tunstall</i>)	44
No. The policy of Austria-Hungary after the assassination of Archduke Franz Ferdinand reflected a determination to maintain the Dual Monarchy’s status as a great power, able and willing to act independently in defense of its own vital interests. (<i>John Wheatley</i>)	47
BEF Technology: Did the integration of tanks in the British Expeditionary Force (BEF) contribute to the Allied victory?	51
Yes. Armor was the central element of British Expeditionary Force (BEF) tactics in the final offensives of 1918. (<i>Robert M. Citino</i>)	52
No. In the final Allied offensives of 1918 mechanical warfare and tanks were less significant to victory than traditional technologies, especially artillery. (<i>William J. Astore</i>)	55
Combat Experience: Did blood lust prolong the war?	59
Yes. The blood lust exhibited by frontline soldiers throughout the conflict stopped only with the collapse of the German war effort. (<i>William R. Forstchen</i>)	60
No. The ordinary frontline soldier was no more inclined to act aggressively against the enemy than to adopt a “live and let live” approach toward him. (<i>Mary Habeck</i>)	61
Culture of the Offensive: Were the war plans of 1914 manifestations of a “culture of the offensive” at any cost?	66
Yes. Between 1871 and 1914 European armies moved toward an intellectualized concept of the offensive as a sovereign recipe for victory, without regard for the objective analyses of developments in technology and administration that predicted a prolonged war. (<i>William R. Forstchen</i>)	67
No. Many military planners before 1914 envisioned a limited offensive war of short duration in which the European balance of power would be maintained. (<i>Daniel Lee Butcher</i>)	69
No. The general commitment to offensive warfare reflected a careful calculation of prewar armies’ perceived strengths, weaknesses, and potential as well as the similarities characterizing those armies. (<i>Robert T. Foley</i>)	72

David Lloyd George: Was David Lloyd George an effective wartime prime minister?	77
Yes. Lloyd George provided strong leadership when Britain was under intense pressure on many fronts. His personal charm and political skills were major assets, and it is unlikely any of his contemporaries could have done better. (<i>Philip Giltmer</i>)	78
No. Lloyd George's pursuit of victory at all costs committed Britain to policies that could not be sustained, and the nation's survival depended upon strokes of good fortune. (<i>Robert McJimsey</i>).	81
East Africa: Was the 1914–1918 campaign of German general Paul von Lettow-Vorbeck in East Africa a success?	84
Yes. As both a military operation and an example of creating a multiethnic army, Lettow-Vorbeck's campaign was brilliant. (<i>Michelle Moyd</i>)	85
No. The demographic and ecological havoc wrought by Lettow-Vorbeck's operations had little impact on the German war effort. (<i>William J. Astore</i>).	87
Eastern Europe: Did German occupation policies in Eastern Europe prefigure those of the Third Reich?	91
Yes. The Nazis, who added genocidal racism to the mix, perpetuated German views of the East and its peoples as fields of conquest and development. (<i>Lawrence A. Helm</i>).	92
No. The German occupation of Eastern Europe was concerned initially with providing administration and security and subsequently with reorganizing the conquered territory along traditional imperialist lines. (<i>Paul Du Quenoy</i>)	97
Easterners and Westerners: Was the conflict between Prime Minister David Lloyd George and Chief of Staff Sir William Robertson the result of a basic disagreement on war strategy?	102
Yes. David Lloyd George emphasized military operations in the East while Sir William Robertson advocated continuing the offensive in the West. (<i>Michael S. Neiberg</i>)	103
No. David Lloyd George and Sir William Robertson had flexibility in their respective positions, but they were unable to find a way of working together systematically. (<i>William J. Astore</i>).	105
Firepower and Mobility: Was the crucial military problem of World War I an imbalance between firepower and mobility on the battlefield?	109
Yes. By successfully addressing the tactical problem of the "last 300 yards of no man's land," the Allies won the Great War. (<i>William J. Astore</i>).	110
No. The crucial military problem of World War I was that Allied leaders formulated offensive strategies that never accommodated the realities of trench warfare. (<i>David J. Ulbrich</i>)	112
Gallipoli: Was the Allied effort on the Gallipoli Peninsula doomed from the start?	117
Yes. Allied planners seriously underestimated Turkish fighting capabilities and defensive preparations. (<i>Edward J. Erickson</i>)	118
No. Poor decisions made on the strategic, operational, and tactical levels determined the failure of the Gallipoli campaign. (<i>Dennis Showalter</i>)	121
Gender Roles: Were women excluded from the Great War?	124
Yes. World War I essentially was a masculine activity. (<i>David J. Ulbrich</i>)	125
No. The Great War was an experience that both transcended and denied sex-role stereotyping. (<i>William J. Astore</i>)	128

German Commerce Raiders: Were German surface-commerce raiders effective?	132
Yes. Surface raiders exercised continuous pressure on commercial shipping in open waters. (<i>Sanders Marble</i>)	133
No. Surface-commerce raiding was obsolescent as early as 1914, having no more than a nuisance value against the British maritime empire. (<i>David H. Olivier</i>)	135
German Economic Mobilization: Was the 1916–1917 Hindenburg-Ludendorff program for German economic mobilization a failure?	139
Yes. The mobilization of national resources intended by the program took little account of German economic realities. (<i>Dennis Showalter</i>)	140
No. The program eventually did succeed in integrating the army, industry, and labor behind the war effort to a significant degree. (<i>David N. Spires</i>)	143
Internal French Politics: Did internal French politics prior to World War I significantly weaken relations between the civil government and the military?	146
Yes. The mutual suspicion and hostility of the years before 1914 endured throughout the conflict and negatively shaped French conduct in the war. (<i>Michael S. Neiberg</i>)	147
No. Prewar political animosity dissipated with the need to confront a common challenge and enemy. (<i>Eugenia C. Kiesling</i>)	151
Irish Independence: How did the Great War affect the Irish independence movement?	154
The Great War renewed the historical divisions of British intransigence and Irish nationalist factionalism, resulting in the drift of the independence movement into militancy. (<i>Robert McJimsey</i>)	155
The Great War afforded the Irish independence movement with an opportunity to strike against Britain while its attention was concentrated on the Continent. (<i>William Kautt</i>)	156
By declaring the defense of the rights of small nations among its war aims, Britain lost its moral authority in Ireland and inadvertently strengthened the independence movement there. (<i>James S. Corum</i>)	160
Jewish Community: What impact did the war have on the European Jewish community?	163
Physical devastation and a surge in anti-Semitism combined to make the lot of European Jews far worse in 1919 than in 1914. (<i>Michael S. Neiberg</i>)	164
By the end of the war Europe was more tolerant of Jews as evidenced by their greater role in political, cultural, and intellectual life. (<i>Paul Du Quenoy</i>)	166
Kerensky: Did the Kerensky government make a mistake when it tried to keep Russia in the war?	170
Yes. The decision of the new government antagonized the proponents of the slogan “Peace, Land, Bread!” (<i>Josh Sanborn</i>)	171
No. The new government needed all the help it could get, and the promise of generous French and British support made staying in the war a reasonable calculated risk. (<i>Paul Du Quenoy</i>)	174

Lorraine: Was the 1914 German offensive in Lorraine an appropriate response to altered circumstances on the Western Front?	179
Yes. Having defeated the initial French offensive in Lorraine, the Germans were justified in committing reserves to reinforce their position. (<i>Dennis Showalter</i>).	180
No. Diverting forces to a secondary theater in the south seriously hampered German efforts in Belgium. (<i>Paul Du Quenoy</i>)	182
Lost Generation: Did the Great War create a “lost generation”?	186
Yes. The war did in fact exact a disproportionate physical and psychic toll on Europe’s “best and brightest” young men. (<i>Mary Habeck</i>)	187
No. The “lost generation” was an invention of the interwar years, a convenient excuse for those who failed to meet the challenges that arose after 1918. (<i>Adrian Gregory</i>)	188
New Weapons: Did World War I accelerate the technological development of weaponry?	193
Yes. The synergies of technical development of weaponry during World War I represented a marked change in the conduct of war as well as the attitudes about it. (<i>William J. Astore</i>)	194
No. The technological innovations introduced in 1914–1918 were part of a continuum of increasingly improved firepower capabilities. (<i>William Kautt</i>)	197
Organized Religion: Did organized religion support the war efforts of the various nations involved in the Great War?	202
Yes. Many Christian denominations, motivated by patriotism, viewed the struggle as a spiritual test of their respective nations’ moral virtue. (<i>William J. Astore</i>)	203
No. The churches provided one of the first influential sources of challenge to specific aspects of the war’s conduct. (<i>William Kautt</i>)	207
Ottoman Empire: Did the collapse of the Ottoman Empire during the war establish the conditions for the rise of the Turkish state afterward?	211
Yes. Conflict with various European nations and internal Arab rebellion reduced the Ottoman Empire to a core Turkish state. (<i>Michael S. Neiberg</i>)	212
No. The achievements of the Ottoman Empire during the war were remarkable, and its weaknesses and handicaps in no way prefigured a Turkish nationalist successor state. (<i>Edward J. Erickson</i>)	214
Passchendaele: Should the Passchendaele offensive of 1917 have been called off once it became clear that a breakthrough was impossible?	218
Yes. Because of the early high casualties and failed initial assaults, the British should have stopped the offensive before the heavy rains began. (<i>William J. Astore</i>)	219
No. A steadily increasing British battlefield superiority legitimated Sir Douglas Haig’s belief that the attack was worth pursuing, even under the appalling weather conditions. (<i>Dennis Showalter</i>)	223
Permanent Alliances: Did the system of permanent alliances that arose in Europe after 1871 cause World War I?	225
Yes. The alliances encouraged belligerence and risk taking by making all the great powers believe they would be supported by their allies in almost any situation. (<i>Richard L. Dinardo</i>)	226
No. If any factor shaped diplomacy, it was the perceived weakness of pre-1914 alliance treaties, all of which featured escape clauses and reservations as opposed to affirming mutual support. (<i>Paul Du Quenoy</i>)	228

Plan XVII: Was Plan XVII the blueprint for a French offensive?	232
Yes. Plan XVII was an aggressive military strategy that dictated the need to seize the initiative from the Germans and not allow them time to coordinate a proper defense. (<i>Robert B. Bruce</i>)	233
No. Plan XVII made provisions only for the mobilization and concentration of French troops and not their offensive use on the battlefield. (<i>Eugenia C. Kiesling</i>)	235
Poison Gas: Was the poison gas used in World War I essentially a nuisance weapon?	239
Yes. Gas was used primarily for harassment, increasing the misery of war and lowering morale. (<i>David N. Spires</i>)	240
No. When used properly, in conjunction with small arms fire and artillery barrages, gas was a lethal weapon. (<i>James Corum</i>)	241
Schlieffen Plan: Was the Schlieffen Plan of the German General Staff a sound war strategy?	245
Yes. The various directives that made up the German war plan indicate a high level of flexibility and a willingness to respond to events. (<i>Robert T. Foley</i>)	246
No. The Schlieffen Plan was predicated on an inexorable progression to an all-or-nothing victory. (<i>Antulio Echevarria</i>)	248
No. The Schlieffen Plan seriously underestimated the capabilities of enemy forces and did not take into account their tenacity and rapid deployment. (<i>John Wheatley</i>)	251
Socialists: Did European Socialists give their ultimate loyalty to national governments rather than the universal proletariat during the war?	254
Yes. Socialist parties sustained national war efforts with recruits, votes, and propaganda. (<i>Paul Du Quenoy</i>)	255
No. Socialists took advantage of the general war weariness to advance the cause of workers. (<i>Dennis Showalter</i>)	260
Soldiers' Motivations: What motivated soldiers in all armies to fight?	263
The essential reason why millions of soldiers continued to fight was consent, derived from love of country, hatred of the enemy, and a crusading spirit. (<i>William J. Astore</i>)	264
Comradeship and coercion ultimately kept soldiers at their posts. (<i>David J. Ulbrich</i>)	267
The Somme: Were the British doomed in the Battle of the Somme (1916) by the decision to seek a decisive breakthrough?	271
Yes. Sir Douglas Haig's decision to seek a decisive breakthrough damaged his army's ability to sustain itself in the later stages of the operation. (<i>Dennis Showalter</i>)	272
No. The problems experienced by the British Expeditionary Force (BEF) at the Somme reflected inexperience in planning for such an offensive. (<i>Albert Palazzo</i>)	273
Treaty of Versailles: Did the Treaty of Versailles in 1919 provide the framework for a durable peace?	277
Yes. The Versailles settlement was purposely designed to establish lasting international stability. It was no harsher than comparable treaties and was entirely appropriate for the political environment of 1919. (<i>Michael S. Neiberg</i>)	278
No. The Treaty of Versailles was disastrous because it embittered Germany and fostered political radicalism in that country. (<i>Paul Du Quenoy</i>)	281

Unrestricted Submarine Warfare: Was the German policy of unrestricted submarine warfare a commitment to total war?	287
Yes. By targeting all shipping and sinking vessels without warning, Germany practiced a form of total war on its enemies. (<i>John Abbatiello</i>)	288
No. Although the desire to remove Great Britain from the conflict was great, Germany was incapable of accomplishing such a task. (<i>Mark Karau</i>)	290
 War and America: Did the Great War have a positive impact on the United States?	295
Yes. The war provided focus for the United States and introduced the nation to the nature of its responsibilities as a great power. (<i>Kristi L. Nichols</i>)	296
No. World War I highlighted and exacerbated internal ethnic, social, and economic tensions, while militarizing the country to a far greater degree than even the Civil War. (<i>Michael S. Neiberg</i>)	299
 References	303
Contributors' Notes	311
Index	313