


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No, Churchill's vision of grand strategy, which emphasized peripheral operations, lacked the practical and economic foundations needed for it to succeed. ( <i>Robert McJimsey</i> ) . . . . .	42
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Yes, the front-line combat soldier reached the limits of his endurance in World War II; he was denied the periods of rest experienced by soldiers in earlier wars, and he had to cope with the severe psychological demands of modern warfare—demands that most soldiers could endure for only about six months. ( <i>William R. Forstchen</i> ) . . . . .	47
No, despite the grueling conditions of front-line combat in World War II, victors and vanquished alike found ways of coping that allowed them to continue fighting effectively right up to the end of the war. ( <i>Harold R. Winton</i> ) . . . . .	50
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No, failure in the East was not inevitable, but deteriorating morale, harsh weather conditions, and economic limitations helped to defeat the Wehrmacht in Russia. ( <i>Michael S. Neiberg</i> ) . . . . .	57
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No, at best Eisenhower was an effective coordinator of Allied resources; he remained too removed from actual battle to be called a leader. ( <i>Adrian Lewis</i> ) . . . . .	65
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No, fascism is a nationalistic political movement that exalted race, promoted economic modernization, and demanded violent suppression of all opposition—like National Socialism. ( <i>Dennis Showalter</i> ) . . . . .	78
Yes, although both fascism and National Socialism came out of the upheaval of World War I and tapped into nationalist sentiments, Nazism was driven by racist doctrine. ( <i>Benjamin Zarwell</i> ) . . . . .	80
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Yes, the Wehrmacht was an active and willing participant in German war atrocities, because Nazi indoctrination and racism encouraged German soldiers to view the enemy as less than human. ( <i>Michael S. Neiberg</i> ) . . . . .	86
No, German war atrocities were usually carried out by special units, not the Wehrmacht; in addition, antipartisan actions were often viewed by German soldiers as acceptable interpretations of the rules of war. ( <i>Stephen G. Fritz</i> ). . . . .	88
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Yes, although Hitler made many mistakes, he must be credited with some good strategies, especially at the beginning of the war. ( <i>Robert Citino</i> ). . . . .	105
No, Hitler proved less than competent in managing the war. He made major strategic blunders, and he ignored major responsibilities while he concentrated on minor issues. ( <i>Geoffrey P. Megargee</i> ) . . . . .	108
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Yes, Great Britain, France, the Soviet Union, and the United States could have successfully contained Adolf Hitler by military and political means. ( <i>Michael A. Boden</i> ) . . . . .	114
No, Adolf Hitler could not have been stopped from initiating World War II because neither France nor Great Britain had the commitment or capability to thwart him. ( <i>Regan Hildebrand</i> ). . . . .	116
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Yes, Adolf Hitler employed a radical approach to foreign policy, eschewing traditional balance-of-power politics for an ideologically based plan to dominate the world and eliminate races he considered inferior. ( <i>Robert T. Foley</i> ) . . . . .	122
No, Adolf Hitler's foreign policy falls within traditional European practice, and World War II was the result of bungled policy on the part of his opponents, which he simply took advantage of. ( <i>David Spires</i> ) . . . . .	125
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Yes, local populations played a significant role in Nazi atrocities for a variety of reasons, ranging from ideological to criminal. ( <i>R. L. DiNardo</i> ) . . . . .	129
No, the actions of local populations were insignificant in terms of the instigation and extent of Nazi atrocities. ( <i>Daniel Inkels</i> ) . . . . .	132
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The functionalist interpretation of the origins and events of the Holocaust is most compelling, because Hitler seemed to have considered relocation of Jews rather than extermination as late as 1941. ( <i>Edward B. Westermann</i> ) . . . . .	139

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Yes, the Luftwaffe was a well-trained, effective air force, especially in the early years of the war, despite poor leadership at the highest levels. (James S. Corum) . . . . .	163
No, the Luftwaffe was not an effective air force because it was not designed for a war of attrition. (Daniel B. Ginsberg) . . . . .	167
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MacArthur was an overrated general who failed to provide an adequate defense of the Philippines and later mismanaged the recapture of the archipelago. (Dennis Showalter) . . . . .	175
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Bernard Law Montgomery was a great general who understood the need for marshaled strength and the limitations of his troops. He never suffered a serious defeat by the Germans. (Daniel Lee Butcher) . . . . .	178
Bernard Law Montgomery's success in World War II was more the result of his personality and position as an "outsider" in the British military establishment than his battlefield prowess. (Guy LoFaro) . . . . .	180
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Yes, Adolf Hitler's threat to crush the churches frightened church leaders into granting implicit support for his regime. (Robert T. Foley) . . . . .	186

No, neither the Protestant nor Catholic Church collaborated with Adolf Hitler and the Nazi regime; in fact, the churches actively opposed and undermined state initiatives relating to religion. ( <i>Michael A. Boden</i> ) . . . . .	188
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Yes, Patton was a military leader of the first rank, distinguished by his charismatic leadership, his vision, and his mastery of armored warfare. ( <i>Guy LoFaro</i> ) . . . . .	193
No, though Patton became a master tactician of mobile warfare and a practitioner of the operational level of war, he was not as effective as a military strategist, the highest responsibility of a general in wartime. ( <i>George F. Hofmann</i> ) . . . . .	196
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No, though Rommel was not a brilliant strategist, he was a superb tactician and battle commander at the operational level. ( <i>George F. Hofmann</i> ) . . . . .	204
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Yes, the Second Front should have been opened earlier than June 1944 in order to satisfy the promise made by the Western allies to the Soviets and to promote trust among the Americans, British, and Soviets. ( <i>Mary Kathryn Barbier</i> ) . . . . .	208
No, although the Allies wanted to open a second front, the Americans were inexperienced and unprepared for a cross-Channel invasion, while the British favored attacks on the periphery of German occupied territory. ( <i>Adrian Lewis</i> ) . . . . .	212
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No, the U.S. armed forces were not justified in their segregationist policies. Those policies damaged morale and excluded from combat a badly needed fighting corps. ( <i>Dale E. Wilson</i> ) . . . . .	220
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Yes, the Western democracies should have intervened in the Spanish Civil War to protect vital interests, including financial investments and strategic positioning. ( <i>Daniel Kowalsky</i> ) . . . . .	224
No, Western intervention would have been fruitless because the outcome of the Spanish Civil War was a foregone conclusion. ( <i>James S. Corum</i> ) . . . . .	227
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Yes, Stalin was a great war leader who inspired his people, organized the national economy, and led the Soviet Union to victory over the Germans. ( <i>Greta Bucher</i> ) . . . . .	233

No, Stalin led his nation to victory over the Germans by imposing an inhumane and indefensible policy of terror. (John Wheatley) . . . . .	236
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Yes, American tanks were inferior to both German and Russian tanks in most particulars, although comparisons of characteristics are meaningless outside of the complete strategic and operational contexts, in which armored fighting vehicles are only part of a complex system. (Douglas V. Johnson II) . . . . .	239
No, American tanks were not as inferior as is frequently asserted. They were deficient only in certain performance aspects that were often not vital from a broad perspective. (Charles M. Bailey) . . .	241
No, while Soviet tanks were the best overall vehicles in World War II, the American M-4, produced in large numbers, was not designed to engage the larger German tanks. The M-4 was used by the Allies properly, and it helped to win the war. (Robert M. Citino). . . . .	244
No, U.S. tanks were generally superior to most German models and only slightly inferior to Soviet ones. (William J. Astore). . . . .	247

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Yes, U.S. economic sanctions against Japan were viewed as a threat to economic and territorial expansion by the Japanese military, who then felt compelled to adopt a plan to acquire needed resources and fight the United States if necessary. (Dennis Showalter). . . . .	254
No, the economic embargo imposed on Japan by the United States was more of a pretext than a real factor in the coming of World War II, as the Japanese had a long-standing plan to expand their empire in the Pacific. (Grant T. Weller) . . . . .	256

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Yes, Ultra was decisive because it gave the Allies crucial information about enemy strategic plans, troop dispositions, and logistics. (Dennis Showalter). . . . .	261
No, although Ultra had significance it was only one aspect of Allied intelligence efforts. (William Kautt) . . . . .	262

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The terms of the Versailles agreement were too harsh on Germany, contributing to the economic depression and revival of nationalism that occurred during the Weimar Republic. (Michael A. Boden). . . . .	267
The rise of Hitler and Nazism in Germany was more the result of structural weaknesses inherent within the Weimar political system than of the humiliating terms of the Versailles treaty. (Robert T. Foley) . . . . .	270

<b>Vichy France:</b> Did the Vichy government in France willingly collaborate with the Germans? . . . . .	275
Yes, the Vichy government provided help to the German war effort and the German campaign to eliminate French Jews and resistance fighters. The Vichy regime viewed the German invasion as an opportunity to establish an authoritarian government in France. (Eugenia C. Kiesling) . . . . .	276
No, the policies and actions of Vichy France were pragmatic attempts to maintain French sovereignty despite German domination. (Dennis Showalter). . . . .	278

<b>Wehrmacht: Was the reputation of the Wehrmacht for military superiority deserved? . . . . .</b>	<b>281</b>
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