


# CONTENTS

Foreword by Marc Trachtenberg .....	xi
Preface by Benjamin Frankel .....	xiii
Chronology by Benjamin Frankel .....	xv



<b>Admirals' Revolt:</b> Were U.S. Navy admirals right to challenge publicly the 1949 cancellation of the supercarrier project? .....	3
Yes, the admirals were right to challenge the decision because it diminished the postwar role of the navy. ( <i>Benjamin Frankel</i> ) .....	4
No, the admirals were not right to challenge the civilian leadership. ( <i>James J. Wirtz</i> ) .....	7
<b>Afghanistan:</b> Was U.S. opposition to the Soviet-supported government in Afghanistan the right policy? .....	10
Yes, U.S. policy toward the Soviet-supported government in Afghanistan was successful in blocking communist expansion. ( <i>Paul Du Quenoy</i> ) .....	10
No, U.S. policy toward the Soviet-supported government in Afghanistan sacrificed important foreign-policy goals for marginal ones and left greater problems in its wake. ( <i>Benjamin Frankel</i> ) .....	13
<b>Alliance for Progress:</b> Did the Alliance for Progress achieve its goals? .....	17
Yes, the Alliance for Progress contributed to economic and social development in Latin America and laid the groundwork for later reforms. ( <i>João Resende-Santos</i> ) .....	17
No, the Alliance for Progress fell short of achieving the reforms it promised. ( <i>Benjamin Frankel</i> ) .....	22
<b>Baruch Plan:</b> Was the Baruch Plan a genuine effort to achieve global cooperation on nuclear control? .....	27
Yes, the Baruch Plan attempted to establish international control over nuclear development. ( <i>Benjamin Frankel</i> ) .....	27
No, the Baruch Plan was not a sincere attempt to achieve global cooperation because it included provisions that the United States knew the Soviet Union would find unacceptable. ( <i>Campbell Craig</i> ) .....	30
<b>Berlin Crises:</b> Why did the Berlin crises occur? .....	33
The Berlin crises occurred not because the city had any intrinsic strategic value, but because it was a powerful symbol of the cold-war conflict between capitalism and communism. ( <i>Campbell Craig</i> ) .....	33
The Berlin crises took place because of the vital strategic importance of the city to both the West and the Soviet Union. ( <i>Paul Du Quenoy</i> ) .....	36
<b>Cambodia:</b> Was the U.S. invasion of Cambodia in May 1970 justified? ..	40
Yes, the American invasion of Cambodia was justified because the country was a center of Vietcong activity against South Vietnam. ( <i>Paul Du Quenoy</i> ) .....	41



No, the U.S. invasion of Cambodia was not justified because it had only a marginal effect on North Vietnamese activities in South Vietnam. ( <i>Benjamin Frankel</i> ) . . . . .	44
<b>Central America:</b> Did the Reagan administration pursue the correct policies in Central America? . . . . .	48
Yes, the Reagan administration's policies in Central America successfully blocked the expansion of communism in the region. ( <i>Paul Du Quenoy</i> ) . . . . .	49
No, the Reagan administration unnecessarily militarized U.S. policies in Central America at a time when communism was declining, and it substantially increased U.S. support to regimes that grossly violated human rights. ( <i>Benjamin Frankel</i> ) . . . . .	51
<b>China Hands:</b> Did the China Hands in the U.S. State Department play a positive or a negative role in shaping U.S. policy during the late 1940s? . . . . .	58
The China Hands accurately interpreted events in China and offered good advice on U.S. policy in China in the late 1940s. ( <i>Benjamin Frankel</i> ) . . . . .	59
The role of the China Hands in shaping U.S. policy toward China during the late 1940s was largely negative because of their biased views about Mao Tse-tung. ( <i>Amos Perlmutter</i> ) . . . . .	61
<b>CIA Operations:</b> Did the CIA go too far in its covert operations during the 1950s and 1960s? . . . . .	64
Yes, CIA operations in the 1950s and 1960s discredited the United States. ( <i>Loch K. Johnson</i> ) . . . . .	64
No, CIA operations during the 1950s and 1960s effectively limited full-scale military actions. ( <i>Paul Du Quenoy</i> ) . . . . .	69
<b>Civil Liberties:</b> Did anticommunist measures at the onset of the cold war threaten civil liberties and domestic freedoms in the United States? . . . . .	73
Yes, civil liberties and domestic freedoms were threatened because of excessive fears about communist infiltration of the U.S. government. ( <i>Barak Cohen</i> ) . . . . .	74
No, some measures were justified, and the Supreme Court stood guard over civil liberties and domestic freedoms by rejecting the more sweeping measures. ( <i>Mark Kramer</i> ) . . . . .	77
<b>Containment:</b> Was universal containment preferable to strongpoint containment as a guide to U.S. foreign policy? . . . . .	82
Yes, universal containment, proposed by Paul H. Nitze, was preferable to strongpoint containment, advocated by George F. Kennan, because universal containment took a more realistic approach to communist expansion. ( <i>Benjamin Frankel</i> ) . . . . .	83
No, universal containment was not preferable because it was expensive and indiscriminate. ( <i>Colin Dueck</i> ) . . . . .	85
No, universal containment was not a viable policy option because it led to overextension of resources and to disaster in Vietnam. ( <i>Walter L. Hixson</i> ) . . . . .	87
<b>Cuba Policy:</b> Has U.S. policy toward Fidel Castro in Cuba been prudent and effective? . . . . .	91
Yes, U.S. Cuba policy effectively limited communist expansion in Latin America. ( <i>Grant M. Lally</i> ) . . . . .	92
No, U.S. policy toward Cuba has failed to bring about the downfall of Fidel Castro. ( <i>James Reynolds</i> ) . . . . .	96
<b>Détente:</b> Was détente a success? . . . . .	101
Yes, détente was a success because it reduced tensions and helped to end the cold war. ( <i>Raymond L. Garthoff</i> ) . . . . .	102
No, détente was a failure because the United States and the Soviet Union never agreed on its fundamental meaning. ( <i>Colin Dueck</i> ) . . . . .	104
<b>Finlandization:</b> Could a "Finland" status have been attained for some eastern and central European states? . . . . .	107

Yes, some eastern and central European states could have remained neutral like Finland. ( <i>Benjamin Frankel</i> ) . . . . .	107
No, Soviet insecurities and historical conditions made it unlikely that the Soviet Union would have agreed to a Finland status for eastern and central European countries. ( <i>Paul Du Quenoy</i> ) . . . . .	110
<b>Flexible Response:</b> Was Kennedy's policy of flexible response preferable to Eisenhower's doctrine of massive retaliation? . . . . .	115
Yes, Kennedy's flexible-response doctrine was preferable to Eisenhower's doctrine of massive retaliation because Kennedy's position avoided civilian targets and tailored responses to fit the provocation. ( <i>Jomo Kassaye</i> ) . . . . .	115
No, Kennedy's flexible-response doctrine was not preferable to Eisenhower's massive retaliation, because flexible-response led to the Berlin Crisis and the Cuban Missile Crisis. ( <i>Campbell Craig</i> ) . . . . .	119
<b>Guatemala and Chile:</b> Did the United States pursue the correct policies toward the governments of Jacobo Arbenz in Guatemala and Salvador Allende in Chile? . . . . .	123
Yes, U.S. policies toward Guatemala in 1954 and Chile during the early 1970s blocked the spread of communism in Latin America. ( <i>Grant M. Lally</i> ) . . . . .	124
No, U.S. intervention in the internal affairs of Guatemala and Chile was wrong because it only postponed future instability. ( <i>João Resende-Santos</i> ) . . . . .	128
<b>Hitler and Stalin:</b> Is the comparison between Hitler and Stalin valid and justified? . . . . .	134
Yes, Hitler and Stalin both established brutal totalitarian regimes. ( <i>Mark Kramer</i> ) . . . . .	134
No, Hitler and Stalin were more dissimilar than alike. ( <i>Benjamin A. Valentino</i> ) . . . . .	137
<b>Human Rights:</b> Was Jimmy Carter's emphasis on human rights a sound basis for foreign policy? . . . . .	140
Yes, Jimmy Carter's emphasis on human rights was an effective response to changing geopolitical realities. ( <i>Paul Du Quenoy</i> ) . . . . .	141
No, Jimmy Carter's emphasis on human rights undermined vital alliances and increased international tensions. ( <i>Robert E. Williams</i> ) . . . . .	143
<b>Ideology:</b> Did ideology play an important role in the U.S.-Soviet conflict? . . . . .	148
Yes, ideology played an important role in the cold war because the United States and the Soviet Union both framed their foreign policies in terms of their ideological perceptions. ( <i>Glenn Chafetz</i> ) . . . . .	149
No, ideology was less important than strategic interests in the cold-war conflict between the United States and Soviet Union. ( <i>Mary Hampton</i> ) . . . . .	152
<b>Israel:</b> Has the close alliance between the United States and Israel been helpful to U.S. policies in the Middle East? . . . . .	156
Yes, the close alliance with Israel has helped the United States to contain the spread of communism in the Middle East. ( <i>Benjamin Frankel</i> ) . . . . .	156
No, the close alliance between the United States and Israel has hurt U.S. relations with Arab nations. ( <i>Jerome Slater</i> ) . . . . .	159
<b>Limited Nuclear War:</b> Do limited-nuclear-war doctrines make nuclear wars more likely? . . . . .	165
Yes, the adoption of limited-nuclear-war doctrines makes nuclear war more likely because such wars may be easier to initiate but are difficult to contain. ( <i>Campbell Craig</i> ) . . . . .	166
No, limited-nuclear-war doctrines do not weaken nuclear deterrence. ( <i>David Goldfischer</i> ) . . . . .	169

<b>Marshall Plan:</b> What were the true motivations behind the Marshall Plan? . . . . .	173
The motivation behind the Marshall Plan was to divide Europe between East and West and strengthen European markets for U.S. goods. ( <i>Benjamin Frankel</i> ) . . . . .	173
The chief motivation behind the Marshall Plan was a desire to reunify Western Europe. ( <i>John A. Soares Jr.</i> ) . . . . .	176
<b>Militarizing Containment:</b> Did the United States unnecessarily militarize the conflict with the Soviet Union? . . . . .	180
Yes, the United States vastly overestimated Soviet military strength. ( <i>Walter L. Hixson</i> ) . . . . .	180
No, the United States militarized the conflict in response to Soviet expansionism. ( <i>Paul Du Quenoy</i> ) . . . . .	183
<b>Military "Gaps":</b> Was it reasonable to believe during the cold war that there were bomber and missile gaps between the United States and the Soviet Union? . . . . .	188
Yes, given the intelligence then available, it was reasonable to believe that gaps existed. ( <i>Peter J. Roman</i> ) . . . . .	189
No, there were no gaps in strategic forces that put the United States at a disadvantage. ( <i>Paul Du Quenoy</i> ) . . . . .	191
<b>Missile Defense:</b> Was a ballistic-missile defense system a viable option? . . . . .	195
Yes, a ballistic-missile defense system would have provided protection to the United States and put military and financial pressure on the USSR. ( <i>Paul Du Quenoy</i> ) . . . . .	196
No, a ballistic-missile defense was technologically unfeasible, strategically unwise, ill-advised, prohibitively costly, and irrelevant to the threats the United States was facing. ( <i>Benjamin Frankel</i> ) . . . . .	198
<b>NATO:</b> Was Wilsonianism or realpolitik the most important reason for the creation of NATO? . . . . .	204
The most important reason for the creation of NATO was Wilsonian idealism about international security. ( <i>Mary Hampton</i> ) . . . . .	204
NATO was created to counter real threats to Western democracies. ( <i>Benjamin Frankel</i> ) . . . . .	206
<b>New Look:</b> Was the New Look an effective and prudent doctrine? . . . .	210
Yes, during the early years of the Eisenhower administration, the New Look policy allowed the United States to secure its vital interests at a relatively low cost. ( <i>Campbell Craig</i> ) . . . . .	211
No, the New Look was dangerous and poorly controlled. ( <i>Peter J. Roman</i> ) . . . . .	213
<b>Nonproliferation:</b> Has U.S. nuclear-nonproliferation policy been successful? . . . . .	216
Yes, U.S. nuclear-nonproliferation policy has contained the spread of nuclear weapons. ( <i>Jordan Seng</i> ) . . . . .	217
No, U.S. nuclear-nonproliferation policy has not been successful because of inconsistent application and lax enforcement. ( <i>Shane J. Maddock</i> ) . . . . .	220
<b>Nuclear Deterrence:</b> Has nuclear-deterrence theory been a sound basis for policy? . . . . .	225
Yes, nuclear-deterrence policies have prevented major wars among the nuclear powers. ( <i>Jordan Seng</i> ) . . . . .	226
No, nuclear deterrence risks nuclear holocaust. ( <i>David Goldfischer</i> ) . . . . .	228
<b>Nuclear Preemption:</b> Was the United States correct in not trying to preempt the nascent Soviet nuclear arsenal? . . . . .	234
Yes, trying to destroy the Soviet nuclear arsenal would have been imprudent and immoral. ( <i>David Goldfischer</i> ) . . . . .	234
No, the United States should have attacked the Soviet nuclear arsenal to slow the Russians' nuclear-weapons development. ( <i>Paul Du Quenoy</i> ) . . . . .	237

<b>Nuclear Spying:</b> How important was Soviet nuclear spying in the United States to the Soviet nuclear-weapons program? . . . . .	241
Soviet nuclear spying in the United States was vital to the Soviet nuclear-weapons program. ( <i>Mark Kramer</i> ) . . . . .	242
Nuclear spying in the United States helped the Soviets, but their development of nuclear weapons was the result of domestic scientific advances as well as foreign espionage. ( <i>Joseph Dresen</i> ) . . . . .	244
Soviet nuclear spying in the United States was not critically important to the Soviet nuclear-weapons program. ( <i>Margot Baumann</i> ) . . . . .	247
<b>Nuclear Weapons:</b> Did the cold war remain “cold” because of the existence of nuclear weapons? . . . . .	250
Yes, the cold war remained “cold” because both sides feared nuclear devastation. ( <i>James J. Wirtz</i> ) . . . . .	250
No, the cold war remained “cold” because of a status quo that satisfied the basic interests of the United States and the Soviet Union. ( <i>John Orme</i> ) . . . . .	252
<b>Origins:</b> Did the Soviet Union start the cold war? . . . . .	258
Yes, the cold war was the result of the belligerence of Joseph Stalin and the insecurity it caused in the United States and the West. ( <i>Campbell Craig</i> ) . . . . .	259
No, the primary responsibility for the cold war derives from the hard-line policies of the United States. ( <i>Dale C. Copeland</i> ) . . . . .	262
<b>Quemoy and Matsu:</b> Were the stakes at Quemoy and Matsu high enough for the United States to risk war with communist China? . . . . .	265
Yes, preventing communist China from taking over Quemoy and Matsu was important to check communist expansion. ( <i>Campbell Craig</i> ) . . . . .	266
No, Quemoy and Matsu were not strategically important enough to warrant a war between the United States and communist China. ( <i>Ming Zhang</i> ) . . . . .	268
<b>Rollback:</b> Did the Eisenhower administration regard “rollback” as a viable policy option? . . . . .	271
Yes, the Eisenhower administration regarded “rollback” as an effective countermeasure to communist expansion. ( <i>Benjamin Frankel</i> ) . . . . .	271
No, the Eisenhower administration decided that “rollback” was a dangerous strategy. ( <i>Campbell Craig</i> ) . . . . .	274
<b>Suez War:</b> Was it wise for the United States to pressure Britain, France, and Israel to withdraw their forces from Egypt during the Suez War of 1956? . . . . .	277
Yes, to maintain good relations in the Middle East, assert its anti-imperialist principles, and uphold its responsibilities as a superpower, the United States had to oppose the invasion of Egypt by British, French, and Israeli forces. ( <i>Michael Spirtas</i> ) . . . . .	278
No, U.S. pressure on Great Britain, France, and Israel during the 1956 Suez crisis increased tensions in the Middle East, creating the need for greater U.S. military involvement in the region and facilitating Soviet intrusion into Middle Eastern affairs. ( <i>Benjamin Frankel</i> ) . . . . .	280
<b>Universalism:</b> Was the universalist approach to foreign affairs a viable option for U.S. policymakers in the immediate aftermath of the Second World War? . . . . .	284
Yes, the universalist approach was a reasonable policy for fostering international cooperation. ( <i>Benjamin Frankel</i> ) . . . . .	285

No, Soviet expansionism made the universalist approach an unworkable policy option for the United States. (Paul Du Quenoy) . . . . .	287
--	-----

<b>Vietnam War:</b> Was U.S. military intervention in Vietnam justified? . . . . .	290
Yes, U.S. military intervention in Vietnam was in keeping with the U.S. policy of containing communism. (Benjamin Frankel) . . . . .	292
No, U.S. military intervention in Vietnam did not serve U.S. interests, and it violated the precepts of the Western concept of a “just” war. (Jerome Slater) . . . . .	295

<b>Yalta Agreement:</b> Was the Yalta Agreement the best the West could have negotiated? . . . . .	300
Yes, because of the presence of Soviet troops in eastern and central Europe and the Soviets’ strategic interest in the region, the Yalta Agreement was the best the West could have negotiated. (Benjamin Frankel) . . . . .	301
No, the Yalta Agreement conceded too much to the Soviets. (Amos Perlmutter) . . . . .	304

<b>Yom Kippur War:</b> Why did Syria and Egypt limit their aims in their October 1973 war with Israel? . . . . .	308
Syria and Egypt limited their 1973 war aims because Egypt knew the limitations of its troops. (Kenneth M. Pollack) . . . . .	309
Syria and Egypt sought political, not military, goals in the October 1973 war, and they achieved these goals. (Talal Belrhiti) . . . . .	313

References . . . . .	319
----------------------	-----

Contributor Notes . . . . .	335
-----------------------------	-----

Index . . . . .	337
-----------------	-----