


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No. The American volunteers fought to save the Republic from overthrow by the fascists and not for the Communist Party. ( <i>Cary Nelson</i> ) . . . . .	5
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Yes. Benito Mussolini's sponsorship of the aborted Sanjurjo rebellion of 1932 and both the Italian dictator's and Adolf Hitler's immediate assistance to Francisco Franco indicate that international fascism provided the inspiration and sustenance for the 1936 coup d'état. ( <i>Daniel Kowalsky</i> ) . . . . .	52
No. Although foreign assistance was required in the area of logistical support and military aid, the uprising was a response to specific grievances by the Spanish army against the II Republic; no outsiders were involved in planning or directing the generals' plot. ( <i>Brian D. Bunk</i> ) . . . . .	54
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No. The tension caused by elements in the colonial army bent on preserving traditional social, religious, and economic systems and a popular desire for democratic government made the Spanish Civil War inevitable. ( <i>Julius Ruiz</i> ) . . . . .	103
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No. The fall of the II Republic resulted from a combination of outside interference on the part of Germany, Italy, and the Soviet Union, and indifference on the part of France, Britain, and the United States. ( <i>Enrique A. Sanabria</i> ) . . . . .	113
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No. The International Brigades were a propaganda instrument of the Communist Party that formed a small part of the significant international support in manpower and matériel that proved essential for the defense of the Republic in the first two years of the war. ( <i>Veronica Lasanowski</i> ) . . . . .	120
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No. International popular opinion, which strongly favored the Loyalist cause, failed to compel any Western government to prevent the gradual destruction of the democratically elected Republic. ( <i>Joshua Goode</i> ) . . . . .	129
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The Nationalists enjoyed advantages in all strategically relevant areas including armed forces, leadership, political and religious unity, and foreign support. ( <i>Sean Costigan and Meagan Cooke</i> ) . . . . .	166
The Nationalists won because General Francisco Franco, despite his failings, was a more effective military leader than anyone on the Republican side. ( <i>Geoffrey Jensen</i> ) . . . . .	169
German and Italian military assistance gave the Nationalists a decided advantage. ( <i>Robert H. Whealey</i> ) . . . . .	171
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No. Describing the Spanish Civil War as a laboratory for military tactics and technology misrepresents both events in Spain and the process by which military doctrines develop. ( <i>Eugenia C. Kiesling</i> )	238
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No. The brutality of the war affected the Spanish people on a personal level, but it did not significantly influence military operations. ( <i>Geoffrey Jensen</i> )	247
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Yes. Both sides resorted to social, political, and economic mobilization characteristic of total war. ( <i>James S. Corum</i> )	252
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No. Weapons provided to the Nationalist and Republican forces were standard arms of the assisting powers and did not require any further evaluations or development. ( <i>William J. Astore</i> )	261
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No. Western intervention ran the risk of engulfing Europe in a continentwide war. ( <i>Scott Eastman</i> )	268
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Yes. The mobilization of women by both sides, and their ready incorporation into hitherto masculine domains, was an unprecedented development with no real parallels prior to 1936. ( <i>Jessica Davidson</i> )	274
No. The initial gains made by women in the Republic were comprehensively reversed in Francisco Franco's gradual conquest of Spain. ( <i>Aurora G. Morcillo</i> )	276
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Yes. Anticipating World War II, Germany, Italy, and the Soviet Union used the Spanish conflict to improve military, diplomatic, and economic positions against major rival nations. ( <i>James S. Corum</i> )	282

No. The Spanish Civil War was a national conflict directed by Spaniards; the warring nations of 1939–1945 had only sporadic influence or interest. ( <i>Dennis Showalter</i> ) . . . . .	284
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## Appendix

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In the Nationalist zone, propagandists adhered to a rigid formula based on the Franquista ideology of Catholic reconquest and national liberation. In an authoritarian movement, the role of graphic propaganda was less crucial than in the Republic, where public opinion required vigorous monitoring and manipulation. ( <i>Enric Ucelay-da Cal</i> ) . . . . .	294

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The Spanish Civil War held an immediate appeal for intellectuals and literary figures in the West because it was the last great cause of a politically active decade. ( <i>Cary Nelson</i> ) . . . . .	331
Many of the Republicans and their international supporters were influential literary figures and artists, and when the Republic was defeated, the literature allowed them the means to keep the Loyalist cause alive. ( <i>José Manuel Del Pino and Antonio Gomez Lopez-Quñones</i> ) . . . . .	334

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