


CONTENTS

About the Series	xiii
Acknowledgments	xiv
Permissions	xv
Preface by Paul du Quenoy	xvii
Chronology by James F. Tidd Jr.	xix



Allied Intervention: Was the Allied intervention in Soviet Russia that began in 1918 intended to crush communism?	1
Yes. The Allied military presence was aimed at eradicating the Bolshevik regime. (<i>Vasilis Vourkoutiotis</i>)	1
No. The Allies were concerned mainly with protecting their own wartime and postwar geopolitical and strategic interests in the region. (<i>Peter Rainow</i>)	4
Appeasement: Was the British and French policy of appeasing Nazi Germany during the 1930s based on a belief that Adolf Hitler's demands and actions were reasonable?	8
Yes. The majority view in the British and French governments was that Adolf Hitler was a "rational actor" who would guarantee peace if his "reasonable" demands were met. (<i>Mary Parks</i>)	9
No. The British and French governments had serious reservations about their military preparedness, and they followed a policy of appeasement, hoping to avoid conflict with Nazi Germany. (<i>Peter Rainow</i>)	11
Bolshevik Revolution: Was the 1917 Bolshevik uprising in Russia truly a popular revolution?	15
Yes. The Bolsheviks gave voice to the concerns of the Russian masses and harnessed their discontent to bring about a successful revolution. (<i>Andrei P. Tsygankov</i>)	16
No. The Bolsheviks had much less popular backing than they later claimed and succeeded only through terrorist tactics and the incompetence of their opponents. (<i>Catherine Blair</i>)	18
British Entry into World War I: Did the Germans have reason to doubt that the British would declare war in 1914?	22
Yes. The British leadership was highly fragmented and reluctantly went to war only after it identified specific threats from Germany. (<i>Margaret Sankey</i>)	23
No. British entry into World War I was inevitable, especially after Germany invaded Belgium, because Britain could not permit the domination of the continental Channel ports by any other nation. (<i>Niles Illich</i>)	24

Collapse of the Habsburgs: Was the Habsburg Empire doomed from the beginning of World War I?	29
Yes. The war accelerated long-standing patterns of disintegration while creating new challenges to the unity of the empire. (<i>Lawrence A. Helm</i>)	30
No. Major threats to the cohesion of the empire came only after several years of fighting, and the empire might have survived if the Allies had not sided with Slavic nationalist movements as a means of weakening Habsburg domination in Central and Eastern Europe. (<i>Joe King</i>)	33
Collapse of the Soviet Union: Was the collapse of the Soviet Union inevitable?	38
Yes. The Soviet system had inherent political and economic flaws that made it unsustainable. (<i>Paul du Quenoy</i>)	39
No. The Soviet Union had the potential to remain stable; it was brought down by foreign pressures and bad leadership decisions. (<i>Peter Rainow</i>)	44
Collapse of Tsarist Russia: Was the fall of the Russian monarchy in 1917 an inevitable result of the tsarist government's inability to deal with political, social, and economic change?	49
Yes. Russia's undemocratic monarchy, its fragmented society, and its troubled economy made radical revolution inescapable. (<i>Catherine Blair</i>)	50
No. The defeats and failures of domestic leadership during World War I drove Russia to revolution. (<i>Thomas Earl Porter</i>)	51
Collapse of Yugoslavia: Was the disintegration of Yugoslavia caused by the opportunism of nationalist politicians?	57
Yes. Secessionist leaders used Western support of their nationalist goals for personal, political, and economic aggrandizement. (<i>York Norman</i>)	58
No. The breakup of Yugoslavia into smaller states was an inevitable consequence of its multiethnic character and Tito's failure to create a unified nation. (<i>Kerry Foley</i>)	61
Colonialism: Did European nation-states systematically plan to become colonial powers?	64
Yes. European nation-states deliberately engaged in colonialism to dominate markets, trade routes, and sources of raw materials. (<i>Sean Foley</i>)	65
No. Colonial empires were not the result of deliberate planning; they were the products of European attempts to maintain regional stability. (<i>Paul du Quenoy</i>)	69
Concert of Europe: Was the nineteenth-century Concert of Europe an effective model for twentieth-century diplomacy?	72
Yes. The international system established at the Congress of Vienna was a model of reasonable foreign relations and managed international peace for twentieth-century politicians. (<i>Dennis Showalter</i>)	73
No. The Concert of Europe depended purely on interests that coincided in certain sets of circumstances and frequently became irreconcilable; twentieth-century aspirations to imitate it were inappropriate and futile. (<i>York Norman</i>)	74
Decolonization: Did European colonial powers give up their empires after World War II because they were too weak to maintain them?	79
Yes. European nations gave up their colonies as a result of military weakness and international pressure. (<i>Paul du Quenoy</i>)	80

No. Europeans gave up their colonies because their leaders determined that such possessions were no longer necessary or profitable. (<i>Sean Foley</i>)	85
Disarmament: Were the twentieth-century attempts at disarmament in Europe effective?	90
Yes. Disarmament negotiations in the 1920s and 1990s helped to reduce international tensions and to limit arms races. (<i>Phil Giltner</i>)	91
No. Disarmament negotiations usually produced only tactical truces that were transient and ineffective solutions to problems of great-power politics. (<i>Paul du Quenoy</i>)	92
Eastern Europe after World War I: Were the new states created in Eastern Europe after World War I viable political entities?	99
Yes. Despite some difficulties, the new states of Eastern Europe were adept at solving domestic problems and resolving international disputes. (<i>York Norman</i>)	100
No. The new states of Eastern Europe were inherently unstable and lacked both legitimacy and long-term viability. (<i>Jelena Budjevac</i>)	102
Eclipse of Europe: Was the eclipse of Europe as the arbiter of world affairs in the twentieth century inevitable?	106
Yes. Twentieth-century shifts in demographics, military strengths, economic growth, and the global balance of power assured a diminished role for Europe in world affairs. (<i>Peter Rainow</i>)	106
No. Though the two world wars weakened Europe's position in world affairs, it reasserted itself as a political force by the end of the century. (<i>Phil Giltner</i>)	111
Fall of France: Were military factors the sole reason for the German defeat of France in 1940?	113
Yes. France fell because of Germany's technological and strategic superiority. (<i>David Marshall</i>)	114
No. France was defeated because it suffered from psychological demoralization, political dissension, and moral decadence. (<i>Richard Crane</i>)	115
Finland after 1945: Was the post–World War II status of Finland indicative of the Soviet Union's ideal goals for Eastern Europe?	121
Yes. "Finlandization," whereby a neighboring state was allowed to maintain its independence but did not pursue policies detrimental to Soviet security, was the Soviet goal for Eastern European countries, but security threats from the West caused the Soviets to impose strict control on Eastern European satellites. (<i>Peter Rainow</i>)	122
No. Finland was a special case. It was allowed to remain neutral because of its efficient army and the lack of a border with Germany, which the Soviets viewed as a possible future aggressor. (<i>John A. Soares Jr.</i>)	125
France after 1945: Did France become a stable polity during the second half of the twentieth century?	129
Yes. Despite the failure of the Third and Fourth Republics in the twentieth century, France has achieved a highly resilient political system that commands the respect of the people. (<i>Aristotle A. Kallis</i>)	130
No. The French government is still dogged by discontent, radicalism, and challenges to its political legitimacy. (<i>Paul du Quenoy</i>)	134

French Fascism: Was fascism an important factor in French politics before World War II?	140
Yes. Several influential militant right-wing groups in France during the 1920s and 1930s fit a general definition of fascism. (<i>Paul du Quenoy</i>)	140
No. Although a series of significant antidemocratic groups existed in France, the country never had a substantial fascist movement. (<i>Dennis Showalter</i>)	143
Hitler's Rise to Power: Did Adolf Hitler rise to power in Germany through a legal, democratic process?	147
Yes. Hitler's expert management of politics enabled him to obtain power through strictly democratic means. (<i>Vasilis Vourkoutiotis</i>)	148
No. Hitler rose to power by scheming with influential antidemocratic political figures and grossly violating the democratic German constitution and legal system. (<i>York Norman</i>)	150
Independent Foreign Policy: Did the attempts of Western European leaders at rapprochement with the Soviet Union during the Cold War serve their best interests?	155
Yes. The leaders of France and Germany correctly viewed the superpower confrontation between the United States and the Soviet Union as an opportunity for their nations to reemerge as independent powers in world affairs. (<i>Peter Rainow</i>)	156
No. Western European nations ultimately failed to establish a middle position in the Cold War and harmed their true interests and alliance relationships in the process. (<i>Phil Giltner</i>)	158
Lend-Lease and the Soviet Union: Was the American Lend-Lease aid to the Soviet Union essential to defeating Germany?	162
Yes. American Lend-Lease aid was decisive because it provided the Soviet Union with \$11 billion worth of logistical support, weaponry, and raw materials for war industries. (<i>Paul du Quenoy</i>)	163
No. American war materials sent to the Soviet Union were often too limited in quantity and quality to make a difference in the war effort. (<i>Matthew Frank</i>)	167
Modernization: Did World War I initiate radical change in the nature and functions of the European state?	171
Yes. The demands of World War I led to permanent, massive state involvement in national economies and societies. (<i>Phil Giltner</i>)	171
No. The modernization of European political systems was well under way by 1914; the war just accelerated an ongoing process. (<i>David Marshall</i>)	175
Monarchy: Did the monarchy play a significant role in twentieth-century European governments?	177
Yes. Monarchies had, and continue to have, important symbolic value for European nations and have been stabilizing and cohesive influences in turbulent times. (<i>Paul du Quenoy</i>)	177
No. Monarchy is an outdated and arbitrary institution that is inappropriate and unnecessary for the government of modern states and societies. (<i>Phil Giltner</i>)	181

Operation Barbarossa: Was Adolf Hitler's decision to invade the Soviet Union irrational?	184
Yes. Blinded by his ideologically driven pursuit of a pure National Socialist empire and his fear of a Soviet attack, Adolf Hitler overestimated Germany's resources and miscalculated the strength and resolve of the Soviets. (<i>Aristotle A. Kallis</i>)	185
No. Adolf Hitler and his generals had valid reasons to expect a successful invasion of the Soviet Union: the Soviet army was poorly trained and equipped, and Germany needed to solidify its control over Eastern Europe. (<i>Peter Rainow</i>)	188
Outbreak of World War I: Did Germany cause World War I?	192
Yes. World War I arose from a multilateral attempt to restrain the burgeoning power and expansionist tendencies of Germany. (<i>Peter Rainow</i>)	192
No. World War I was caused by clashing strategic interests, interlocking alliance structures, and widespread desires to stabilize turbulent domestic politics. (<i>Scott Varho</i>)	194
Russia in World War I: Was Imperial Russian doomed to defeat in World War I?	199
Yes. Russia could not cope with the demands of modern warfare or the military might of Germany. (<i>Paul du Quenoy</i>)	200
No. Russia was much more resilient than has commonly been recognized and fought until its domestic political situation collapsed. (<i>Brandon C. Schneider</i>)	204
Second Thirty Years' War: Can the period 1914–1945 be compared usefully to the Thirty Years' War?	208
Yes. In both the period 1914–1945 and the Thirty Years' War European powers attempted to thwart the hegemonic designs of a Germanic state. (<i>Dennis Showalter</i>)	208
No. The two world wars had different causes and results than the Thirty Years' War, and comparisons between them are misleading. (<i>Paul du Quenoy</i>)	211
Soviet Union as an Ally: Would the Soviet Union have been a reliable partner in a collective-security alliance with Western Europe against Nazi Germany during the interwar years?	217
Yes. A Western European alliance with the Soviet Union during the interwar years would have been helpful in deterring German aggression. (<i>Peter Rainow</i>)	218
No. Despite its bluster, the Soviet Union was neither ideologically willing nor militarily able to become an Eastern counterweight to Hitler's Germany. (<i>John A. Soares Jr.</i>)	221
Soviet-Western Cooperation after 1945: After World War II did the Soviet Union honor its wartime pledge to Western Allies to allow democratically installed governments within its Eastern European spheres of influence?	226
Yes. The Soviet Union generally honored its pledges to the Western Allies in order to preserve the partnership that had existed during the war, and it installed communist regimes in Eastern Europe only after the West appeared hostile. (<i>Sarah Snyder</i>)	227
No. The Soviets always intended to "Bolshevize" Eastern Europe in order to satisfy their security requirements, and they did so without regard for their wartime agreements with the West. (<i>Anton Fedyashin</i>)	228

Suez Crisis: Was superpower pressure the determining factor in Gamal Abdel Nasser's ultimately successful nationalization of the Suez Canal Company?	235
Yes. The Soviet threat of intervention and the lack of American support forced Britain, France, and Israel to withdraw from Egypt. (<i>Sean Foley</i>)	236
No. The foreign occupation of the Suez Canal collapsed because of poor planning and inadequate diplomacy on the part of Britain and France. (<i>Paul du Quenoy</i>)	239
Terrorism: Has terrorism been an important factor in twentieth-century European history?	243
Yes. Terrorism has afflicted most major European countries and has had a serious impact on national and international politics. (<i>John Wheatley</i>)	243
No. Terrorist groups in twentieth-century Europe have been generally small, short-lived organizations that have employed ineffective tactics. (<i>Jelena Budjevac</i>)	245
Total War: Was total war a twentieth-century concept?	251
Yes. Mass mobilization of peoples and resources for conflict did not occur until the twentieth century. (<i>David J. Ulbrich</i>)	251
No. Total war had precedents in earlier centuries; twentieth-century technology simply made military domination over civil authority easier to implement. (<i>York Norman</i>)	255
Totalitarianism: Can Josef Stalin's Soviet Union and Adolf Hitler's Germany accurately be described as totalitarian?	259
Yes. Rulers such as Josef Stalin and Adolf Hitler created regimes that successfully controlled every aspect of government and society. (<i>York Norman</i>)	259
No. Totalitarianism is a facile label that political theorists have applied to states, societies, and leaders that were far more complex and faced far more limitations than have conventionally been recognized. (<i>Aristotle A. Kallis</i>)	262
United States as a European Power: Has the United States been "the greatest European power" since World War II?	266
Yes. American involvement in World War II thrust the United States into a long-term and continuing role as the arbiter of European affairs. (<i>Nebojsa Malic</i>)	267
No. Although the United States had a pronounced role in European affairs immediately after World War II, its influence and presence on the Continent has steadily declined since the late 1940s. (<i>Phil Giltner</i>)	269
United States and Western Europe: Did the United States require the invitation of European leaders to assume a major role in Western Europe after World War II?	273
Yes. Western European governments invited the relatively reluctant United States to safeguard Europe from communism. (<i>John A. Soares Jr.</i>)	273
No. The United States needed no invitation to extend its influence in Europe and would never have abandoned its interests there. (<i>Paul du Quenoy</i>)	277
Velvet Revolutions: Were the "Velvet Revolutions" of 1989 in Eastern Europe the result of Soviet weakness?	281
Yes. The democratic revolutions in Eastern Europe during 1989 were peaceful because the Soviet Union lacked the strength and political will to preserve its position in the region. (<i>Peter Rainow</i>)	282

No. The peaceful demise of communist regimes in Eastern Europe occurred because Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev favored an end to the Cold War and a strategic partnership with the United States. (<i>Sarah Snyder</i>)	288
Versailles Treaty: Did the Versailles Treaty (1919) precipitate the rise of Nazism?	291
Yes. The harsh terms of the World War I peace treaty created an environment of mistrust, unrest, and economic hardship that provided fertile ground for German political extremism. (<i>York Norman</i>)	291
No. The Versailles Treaty was a feasible peace settlement that had little to do with the rise of Nazism in Germany. (<i>Niles Illich</i>)	294
Vichy France: Was Vichy France truly a puppet state of Nazi Germany?	298
Yes. Vichy France was a collaborationist regime that fully supported the German war effort, willingly participated in the Holocaust, and forfeited the national sovereignty and honor of France. (<i>David Marshall</i>)	299
No. Vichy France was at the most an accommodationist regime that favored limited cooperation with Germany to minimize the impact of the defeat and to promote the long-term recovery of national sovereignty. (<i>Paul du Quenoy</i>)	301
World War I Peace Settlement: Could World War I have been settled by a negotiated peace?	307
Yes. Most participants in the conflict were willing to negotiate at various stages of the war, but diplomatic blunders and the interference of other powers prevented them from doing so. (<i>Peter Rainow</i>)	307
No. Until late in the war the major powers believed that they and their allies would emerge victorious. (<i>York Norman</i>)	311
World War II Alliances: Was the World War II alliance of the United States, Great Britain, and the Soviet Union truly ironclad?	314
Yes. The Allied powers presented a united front in the pursuit of victory. (<i>Peter Rainow</i>)	315
No. The Allies were consumed by mutual suspicions, strategic disagreements, and serious controversies over the postwar peace settlement. (<i>John A. Soares Jr.</i>)	317
References	321
Contributors	327
Index	329